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I. The meaning of avoidance and aggressive tax planning and the BEPS 
initiative 
1. Legal definition 
In a Belgian context the distinction between tax planning and the more general principle of tax 
avoidance seems rather artificial. Based on the constitutional legality principle persons and goods are 
exempted from taxation, unless expressly provided for by law. As will be explained, this implies that 
‘tax avoidance’ in general, to be construed as setting up a favourable tax structure, is treated in 
combination with the possibility of (even aggressive) tax planning. A distinction has to be made 
between legal tax planning or avoidance and illegal tax evasion or tax fraud.2 
In general, the Belgian Constitution provides that “no taxation can be levied to the benefit of the 
State, unless it has been implemented by a law “.3 Most scholars interpret the word ‘by’ in this phrase 
as demanding a formal involvement of the legislative parliamentary power that has to determine the 
basic aspects of any tax. Only the legislature himself can establish such taxation, which cannot be 
delegated to any other (e.g. executive or administrative) authority.4 
This interpretation is a.o. based on a historical argument, developed from the difference in text 
between the 1831 Belgian Constitution and the preceding Netherlands ‘grondwet’ when this Region 
felt under the reign of the Dutch King Willem. Whereas this preceding text left the possibility to 
delegate (”Geene belastingen kunnen ten behoeve van 's Lands kas worden geheven, dan uit krachte 
van eene wet”), the Belgian constitution reinforced the legality principle as a reaction against abuses 
under the former Netherlands regime.5   
 
Legal theory therefore generally demands a formal act of the legislative authority to establish a tax. 
Whenever the legislature delegates the determination of particular aspects of tax legislation to an 
executive authority, the Constitutional Court will verify whether this only consists of minor practical 
procedures.6 Tax is therefore not to be presumed. Tax liabilities have to be clearly defined in a legal 
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text, that has to be strictly construed. Taxation through analogous interpretation is prohibited in tax 
matters.  
From this point of view the Belgian Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie, Cour de Cassation) has derived 
the free choice for a tax payer to opt for the least taxed way when structuring a particular operation. 
Named after the first case in this context, this is called the ‘Brepols doctrine’. According to the 
Supreme Court “there is no prohibited simulation, and, therefore, tax evasion, where, in order to 
benefit from a more favourable tax treatment, and using the freedom of contract, without however 
violating any legal provision, the parties enter into acts of which they accept all consequences, even if 
the form they give thereto is not the most usual”,
7
 or “even if these acts are entered into with the sole 
purpose of reducing the tax burden”.
8
 Tax avoidance therefore, cannot be considered a crime or 
administrative offence, as a taxpayer does not evade any tax legally due. As long as they accept all 
consequences of their legal transactions, it has to be distinguished from sham or tax evasion. The tax 
administration in general also will have to accept all consequences.
9
 
Although legal, the legislator can limit the scope of this free choice through general, as well as specific 
anti-avoidance rules. (GAARs and SAARs). Besides, one notices that particular legal texts are 
deliberately construed with the purpose of combatting tax avoidance, although this was not necessarily 
the particular aim of the legal text at stake. 
Most Belgian tax codes contain a general anti-avoidance rule. (GAAR)
10
 
Apart from the VAT-code, these GAARs all follow the approach of art. 344, §1 BITC, as reformed by 
a law of 29 March 2012.
11
 This text reads as follows:  
“The legal act or separate legal acts that realise the same operation is/are not binding on the tax 
authorities when the tax administration can, on the basis of objective circumstances, establish by 
means of presumptions or other legal items of evidence mentioned in Article 340 that tax abuse has 
occurred. 
There is tax abuse where the taxpayer carries out, by means of a legal act or a series of legal acts, one 
of the following transactions: 
1. a transaction by which the taxpayer places himself, contrary to the purpose of a provision of this 
Code (i. e. the BITC) or the decrees implementing it, outside the scope of application of such 
provision; or 
2. a transaction through which the taxpayer claims a tax advantage provided for by a provision of this 
Code or the decrees implementing it, the aim of which is essentially the obtaining of such benefit, 
where the granting thereof would be contrary to the purpose of that provision.  
It is up to the taxpayer to prove that the choice of the legal act or series of legal acts is justified by 
other motives than the avoidance of income taxes.  
If the taxpayer does not provide this counterproof, then the taxable base and tax computation are 
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restored so that the transaction is subject to a tax assessment that is consistent with the purpose of the 
law, as if no abuse had occurred”. 
Contrary to the precedent version this text contains an explicit definition of ‘tax abuse’, containing an 
objective and a subjective element.  
The objective element implies the situation the taxpayer has brought himself into. As such, a taxpayer 
can place himself into a situation whereas he benefits from a certain tax favor, although this was not 
the intention of the legislator, or a taxpayer can avoid a particular charging provision, although the 
legislator expected to submit his behaviour to this taxation. It is important to notice the explicit 
reference to a particular tax code or the decrees implementing it. Each tax code has its own definition 
and only refers to its own legislation and executive decrees. Tax legislation that would be 
implemented in separate legal texts therefore would not be covered with this general text.
12
  
Besides, the getting of a favour, as well as the exclusion of a tax, should frustrate the legislator’s 
intention. Defining this intention can however be very difficult in practice. The Minister of Finance 
made a very questionable statement during the discussion of the draft bill. He asserted that tax statutes 
are charging provisions aimed at collecting the financial means necessary to spend in the public 
interest.
13
 However this cannot be seen as the intention of each particular tax law. The specific 
objectives of each provision taken separately cannot be confused with or assimilated to the general 
purpose related to taxation as a whole. The GAARs refer to the purpose of the specific charging/relief 
provision that is at stake. This is ascertainable from the statute itself, the broader legal context in 
which the provision is included and the preparatory works (i.e. the legislative history to the GAARs). 
Unilateral constructions by the tax authorities (circular letters, FAQs, answers by the Minister to 
parliamentary questions, etc.) are irrelevant to this purpose.  
The Constitutional Court has given some details about how the tax authorities can identify the 
objectives of the circumvented tax provisions.
14
 First, it is necessary to prove that the effect of the 
taxpayer’s transaction is inconsistent with the objectives of the tax provision concerned, and not just 
irrelevant to such objectives. Second, this requires that the objectives of the tax provisions are 
sufficiently clearly apparent from the wording and, where appropriate, from the legislative history to 
the draft bill (preparatory documents). Elements to be taken into account by the tax authorities in this 
respect include the general context of the relevant tax law, the practices usually prevalent at the time 
of the entry into force of the tax provision concerned and the possible existence of specific provisions 
already aimed at countering certain abuses of the tax provision concerned. As a consequence, where 
the preparatory works of the circumvented charging/relief provisions are too unclear or are ambiguous, 
the principle in dubio contra fiscum should be applied (unless the objective of the circumvented tax 
provision can be found through a systematic approach to the legal rules at stake). 
The subjective element relates to the taxpayer’s intentions. For a transaction to qualify as tax abuse, 
the taxpayer’s concern to avoid the tax must be either the exclusive motive behind that transaction or 
an essential motive to such an extent that any other concerns should be regarded as negligible or 
purely artificial, not only in economic terms but also with regard to other relevant considerations, 
particularly personal or family considerations.
15
 So, the intention of the taxpayer matters. This is a 
sole-purpose test. Taxpayers can escape the GAAR by proving that the choice for their legal act(s) is 
justified by other genuine non-tax reasons than the avoidance of income tax (or registration/inheritance 
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taxes). Nevertheless, non-tax reasons must be specific to the taxpayer’s transaction, and not be general 
and inherent in all transactions of that nature. In addition, if the non-tax motive(s) is/are specific for 
the taxpayer’s transaction, it/they should not be wholly secondary to tax motives and so insignificant 
that a reasonable taxpayer would not have entered into the transaction in the absence of the tax 
benefits.  
 
The legislative history to the GAARs indicates that the Government was inspired to this purpose by 
the ECJ decisions in the Part Service and Foggia cases
16
. In an administrative Circular
17
 this 
subjective element is further linked to the European notion of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’ although 
in a Belgian context this rather refers to the subjective intention and not to describe the objective 
element. 
Since 200618 the Belgian VAT-Code also provides for a GAAR in art. 1, §10. This text was, when 
implemented, largely inspired by the European case law.19 It reads as follows: 
“For the application of this Code there is supposed to be abuse when the executed transactions result 
in the obtaining of a tax benefit, where the granting thereof is contrary to the purposes of this Code 
and the decrees implementing it and the transactions basically were set up for obtaining this benefit.” 
Besides GAAR’s, the legislator also provides for several specific anti-avoidance rules (SAAR’s) in very 
different contexts. This can be in particular for cross border transactions20, as well as for mere 
domestic tax avoidance mechanisms. Especially in a domestic context the aim of a rule can be very 
diverse, such as a legal requalification of taxable income causing a higher tax burden21, an additional 
taxation because of uncommon transactions22, non-deductibility of certain costs23, particular priority 
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rules in the allocation of distributions24, non-application of an exemption system25, non-opposability 
of legal acts accomplished by another legal subject when taxing third parties26, rules determining the 
application in time of new legislation27, … Some rules apply automatically, while others contain an 
option to exclude the effects, if the taxpayer concerned proves justifiable economic or financial 
reasons for his particular behaviour.28  
Particularly in recent new legislation the legislator provides for very technical punctually defined 
SAAR’s, which will seem rather complex to respect by a tax payer or verify by a tax administration.29 
Given the limited explanation, as well as the rather casuistic incoherent30 approach when defining 
SAAR’s, this leads to increased legal uncertainty.31  
Finally, one can refer to the application of more general legislation by the administration as a tool to 
combat tax avoidance. As such art. 49 BITC mentions some general conditions for costs to be tax 
deductible, which was however construed in a more stringent way by the administration to combat 
certain tax planning possibilities.32 Besides art. 207, 2 BITC limits the use of tax reductions in case of 
transactions under ‘unusual conditions’.33 The administration also tried to use this article as a SAAR, 
but was rejected in recent jurisprudence. As both applications concern case law, they will be treated 
further later on. 
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2. Administrative clarifications  
Given the very technical aspects of anti-avoidance regulations combined with frequent changes, the  
tax administration usually attempts to clarify their meaning through the use of different techniques. 
First of all, when establishing legislation the text of the law is often accompanied by additional 
explanations about the aim of the legislator, the meaning and attended interpretation of the text and 
sometimes also some practical examples.  
However, when further questions rise during the application of legislative acts the administration 
provides for answers through so-called public FAQ’s, administrative Circulars, general commentaries, 
as well as ministerial answers on parliamentary questions. The legal value of these different tools is 
however rather weak. Administrative circulars, as well as particular ministerial answers on 
parliamentary questions are binding for the administration, but not for the individual tax payer or 
courts. Also general commentaries about the legislation sometimes give a very valuable insight of the 
administrative view, but these commentaries are not consequently updated and therefore 
sometimes differ from expressed views in other administrative documents. 
To be able to quicker respond at questions the administration started using FAQ’s published on the 
website of the administration, but their legal value is highly disputable: it is not recognized as a legal 
source, it is not always dated or signed and it is being tacitly adapted in case of changing views. 
Especially when points of view are being expressed that are not literally reflected in the text of the 
law, the legal value of such clarifications is rather doubtful.  
The cited GAAR of art. 344, §1 BITC was introduced in 201234 and replaced an earlier GAAR dating 
from 1993. The preparatory documents for this law therefore in particular focus on the changes 
being expected from this new text. As the old text only applied under very stringent conditions, in 
practice it had a very limited impact on tax avoidance. Therefore the new text, although following 
the same general logic, was meant to facilitate the use of the GAAR by removing certain barriers.35 
This is further elucidated in some subsequent Circulars as will be summarized in this text.36 
A first (federal) Circular explains in general how the new rule has to be understood and focuses on 
some peculiarities. In a following (federal) Circular particular transactions were described and 
analysed whether they would or wouldn’t trigger the application of the GAAR in the context of 
registration duties and inheritance taxes. This latter circular has subsequently been replaced by a 
new list of transactions in a third circular. Although demanded by practitioners, no list has been 
created concerning the envisaged transactions under the BITC. 
The approach of listing up transactions was also followed in the Flemish Region.37  
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The first federal Circular38 explains how the new article 344, §1 BITC has to be understood, and 
focuses in particular on improvements of the new text in comparison with the earlier GAAR. The 
following aspects are being dealt with: 
-Whereas under the old GAAR the administration had to respect the acts of a taxpayer and could 
only change the legal qualification of the acts into a qualification with similar effects, under the new 
text, this is no longer the case. The acts themselves are not opposable at the administration if all 
further conditions are fulfilled. This applies for a single legal act, as well as for a combination of 
separate legal acts realising one same operation, even if these acts would be fulfilled during separate 
tax years. 
-Contrary to the previous text, art. 344, §1 BITC now contains a particular definition of tax abuse, as 
already described. 
-The burden of proof for both the administration and the taxpayer is more precisely described. The 
text leaves it up to the taxpayer to proof that the particular setting of his transaction “is justified by 
other motives than the avoidance of income taxes”. This creates a system of proof and counterproof. 
The tax authorities must establish the objective element of tax abuse and part of the subjective element 
thereof. The first burden is on the tax authorities: they must demonstrate, by means of all legal means 
of proof (including presumptions of facts), that the taxpayer has opted for a legal act (or separate legal 
acts realizing the same operation) that is in contradiction with the objectives of a clearly identified tax 
provision and the motive behind which is to avoid the tax.
39
 The taxpayer can then rely upon all 
justifications other than tax avoidance to prevent any tax adjustment following from the tax abuse 
qualification. Whereas the previous text demanded the tax payer to proof other economic or financial 
needs, the new version does no longer limit the counterproof. All motives, including purely private 
motives, can be demonstrated. Neither the tax authorities, nor the taxpayer should be required to 
provide negative evidence: the tax authorities cannot be expected to prove that the choice of the legal 
act by the taxpayer is solely explained by tax avoidance motives; the taxpayer should not be expected 
to establish the absence of tax motives. Negative evidence amounts to probatio diabolica, what is not 
required by the lawmaker. 
-Because the tax administration no longer needs to requalify certain acts, she can simply ‘replace the 
tax effect’ of the abusive transactions and restore the taxable base so that the taxation becomes 
consistent with the objectives of the tax provisions, as if the abuse did not take place. According to the 
administration this can be realized against one or both parties participating in an 
agreement/transaction
40
, and does not influence other (non-tax) effects of these legal acts. It is clear 
that this position, causing differences in tax aspects and other legal aspects, as well as differences in 
the tax treatment of one unique operation towards different tax payers, can create large inconsistencies 
in the treatment of a transaction.
41
 Besides, also the precise effect of the GAAR, when applied towards 
a tax payer, is not very clear.
42
 The text does not demand from the administration to redefine particular 
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transactions or the taxpayer.
43
 Scholars therefore discuss about the manner and extent of the 
readjustment of a taxpayer’s position. The administration, as well as certain scholars
44
, argues that the 
GAAR changes the scope of a circumvented provision. There is a discrepancy between the text of a 
legal provision and the lawmaker’s objective that underlies this specific provision. The material scope 
of the latter would thus be extended (charging provision) or restricted (exemption/relief provision) so 
that the taxpayer’s avoidance scheme can be taxed (charging provision) or excluded from the tax 
benefit (exemption/relief provision). However, other authors argue that the GAAR allows the tax 
authorities to redefine the taxpayer’s legal act(s) to enable tax assessment in line with the objectives of 
the tax provision at stake.
45
 
The Circular further focuses on particular questions, such as the combination with SAAR’s, possibility 
for tax rulings, … that will be dealt with further in the respective sections. However, one particular 
comment is remarkable. Although the Circular explicitly confirms that the application of the GAAR is 
not a sanction against tax fraud and that a tax payer does not breach any tax rule, it nonetheless accepts 
that the administrative penalties (tax majorations) may be imposed on tax payers, subject of this 
GAAR. 
The subsequent federal Circulars
46
 do not deal with the general interpretation of the GAAR, but list 
examples of tax planning techniques that are considered not to be qualified as tax abuse, or are in 
particular considered to be tax abuse (unless counterproof delivered by the tax payer). 
As mentioned these Circulars only list examples of registration and inheritance duties. Although the 
BITC contains largely the same GAAR-text, and although it would also give some guidance for direct 
taxation cases, this is not illustrated. The circulars repeat that, because all possible arguments can be 
used as counterproof, the GAAR also applies in private contexts as far as inheritance taxes are 
concerned. 
Also the GAAR in art. 1, §10 VAT-Code has been substantially commented in a Circular.
47
 The 
approach is however based on the European jurisprudence and not particularly corrected for a Belgian 
context. Therefore, it will not be further analysed in this Belgian report, although it can be questioned 
whether the rather partial legal implementation, combined with an extensive interpretation is in line 
with the legality principle.
48
 
As for the GAAR, also SAAR’s and particular interpretations of legal articles are being further 
explained in administrative commentaries, as well as other means of clarification. However, especially 
when these clauses form part of a general regulation the comments are integrated within this particular 
topic.
49
 Again these instructions are only binding for the tax administration and not for individual 
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taxpayers. Especially in case not all comments are updated and conflicts or contradictions arise 
amongst the different administrative views, this causes legal uncertainty.  
3. Tax rulings  
Given the unavoidable uncertainty concerning the application of a GAAR, the possibility to get an 
advance ruling from the tax administration on whether (and how) they would apply this rule in a 
particular context is very valuable. In 2002 a Ruling Commission (Service des decisions anticipées / 
Dienst voorafgaande beslissingen) has been installed to provide for a system of anticipated decisions 
in federal tax cases.
50
 Rulings can be delivered concerning the establishment of all taxes falling under 
the competence of the Federal tax authorities, as well as those being recovered by the federal tax 
administration.
51
  
However, a Royal Decree limits the scope of topics that can be submitted to the Ruling Commission.
52
 
In particular it excludes a.o. rulings concerning the use of means of proof or legal remedies.
53
 This has 
caused a doctrinal debate concerning the competence of this Ruling Commission as far as the GAAR 
is concerned. Effectively, when questioned about the constitutionality of art. 344, §1 BITC, the 
Constitutional Court considered this GAAR to be ‘a procedural rule’ (means of proof), that would 
however make it possible to determine the factual tax base.
54
 Also, when judging about its 
predecessor, the Constitutional Court considered art. 344, §1 BITC to be a means of proof for the 
administration to judge individual particular situations in a determined context.
55
 
Therefore, when introducing the new art. 344, §1 BITC the legislator considered the competence of 
the Ruling Commission limited to judging whether the taxpayer could provide valuable 
counterproof.
56
 However, as the Minister of Finance confirmed, such interpretation leads to the strange 
effect that, when a taxpayer consults the Ruling Commission, it could seem as if he implicitly 
confirms that the objective element of tax abuse would have been present.
57
 This could not be the aim 
of the legislator. At present, Belgian scholars do not agree whether, given the mentioned limits of the 
Royal Decree, the Ruling Commission is competent to take a position on the entire application of the 
GAAR.
58
 
In practice however, the Ruling Commission follows the point of view of the Minister of Finance. It 
has already delivered a considerable amount of rulings on the question whether in a particular case the 
demanded counterproof of a taxpayers’ motives would be accepted59, as well as on the entire non-
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application of the GAAR of art. 344 BITC itself
60
. This proves at least that in practice the Ruling 
Commission fulfils an important role in clarifying whether this GAAR would be applicable.
61
 
Also as VAT legislation is concerned, the Ruling Commission already delivered some rulings 
concluding that certain transactions are not considered to be abusive, although it seems that the 
number of rulings is lesser.
62
 
Besides these rulings on the application of a GAAR in particular cases, the Ruling Commission also 
published some general opinions on how it deals with particular frequently raised questions. In this 
context some general opinions also explain how the GAAR could, according to the Ruling 
Commission, be applied in the commented behaviour.
63
  
Finally, the Ruling Commission also provides legal certainty concerning the application of specific 
anti-abuse rules. In this context, it already had to pronounce itself on countless occasions whether 
certain costs are tax deductible
64
, whether a taxpayer could be considered to have valid economic or 
financial needs to act in a particular way
65
, whether a transaction is at arms length
66
, … Although a 
positive ruling can provide some legal certainty for an individual taxpayer, in this context it is clear 
that the Ruling Commission often demands particular conditions from the taxpayer before delivering a 
positive ruling. In this context one could wonder whether the Commission does not exceed its 
competences, especially when particular demands are not literally being foreseen in the tax legislation 
itself.   
4. Existing case law on the meaning of tax avoidance  
GAAR’s, as well as SAAR’s are often used by the tax administration in practice and challenged for 
the courts. However, to determine the general applicable notions of ‘abuse’, ‘tax avoidance’, …, it 
seems less interesting to mention this particular case law. Within this section therefore only the 
general point of view as it can be deducted from the case law of the superior Courts will be 
summarized.  
As already mentioned, the Constitutional Court had to express itself whether the GAAR
67
, as well as 
its predecessor
68
, was in conformity with the Belgian constitutional legality principle, as well as the 
constitutional distribution of competences between the federal and regional entities. The Court 
considered the GAAR a particular means of proof for the federal tax administration when recovering 
taxes due. Although for some taxes the Regional authorities have the exclusive competence to 
determine tax base, tax rate and possible exemptions, being a procedural rule for recovering taxes, the 
federal GAAR does not violate this distribution of competences, as far as the taxes concerned are to be 
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collected by the federal tax administration. Neither do these rules, according to the Constitutional 
Court, violate the legality principle. Given the very strict limitations and conditions for its application, 
the GAAR only limits the free choice of a taxpayer to opt for the least taxed way. Given the general 
phenomenon of tax abuse, it would not be possible for the legislator to define more precisely how this 
rule should be applied. 
In this context, it might be interesting to refer to some judgments of the Court of Justice concerning 
particular Belgian SAARs. The most recent case deals with art. 54 BITC, denying the deduction of 
a.o. interest costs, salaries and license payments paid to a foreign taxpayer or a foreign PE, in case 
these persons are not submitted to income taxation or the payments benefit from a seriously more 
advantageous tax treatment compared to the Belgian tax treatment of such income. Deduction of the 
costs will only be allowed if the Belgian taxpayer proves that the payments concern real and genuine 
transactions and do not exceed the normal limits. When determining its compatibility with the 
European freedom to provide services the Court of Justice noticed a difference with the general 
presumption of deductible costs, making it more difficult for a foreign taxpayer to provide the same 
services. This restriction could be justified by objectives of preventing tax evasion and avoidance and 
of preserving both the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the balanced allocation between Member 
States of the power to impose taxes. However, the Court considered the rule to be framed in such 
vague terms that do not make it possible, at the outset, to determine its scope with sufficient precision, 
causing its applicability to remain a matter of uncertainty. Therefore, the rule could not be considered 
proportionate to these objectives and the mentioned justifications were not accepted.
69
  
In an earlier judgment the Court considered art. 26 BITC in line with the European freedom of 
establishment.
70
 This rule also offers the tax administration the possibility to raise the taxable income 
of a Belgian taxpayer with the amount of unusual or gratuitous advantages being accorded to a related 
foreign company, whereas for domestic entities this rule generally does not apply. This limits the 
freedom of establishment, but can be justified by the objective of preventing tax avoidance, taken 
together with that of preserving the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the 
Member States. Because the initial burden of proof as to the existence of an ‘unusual’ or ‘gratuitous’ 
advantage
71
 rests with the tax administration, after which the taxpayer still has an opportunity to 
provide counterproof, the Court considered this rule not to be disproportional. 
Finally in an older case, the Court had to consider art. 18, 4° BITC
72
. This concerns a Belgian thin cap-
rule requalifying deductible interest payments into non-deductible dividends, if the interests are paid to 
a director and exceed a defined limit. Belgian companies, acting as a director of another company are 
excluded from this regulation. The distinction between Belgian and foreign companies acting as a 
director was considered a restriction on the freedom of establishment and could not be justified. The 
objective of preventing tax avoidance was not accepted, because the threshold for requalification was 
based on a purely mathematical calculation. The tax administration did not need to proof the unusual 
character or that it exceeded market conditions.
73
  
Finally the legislator installed a new GAAR, because of the extreme strict conditions for the previous 
rule to be applicable, as determined in the case law of the Supreme Court.
74
 According to the Court, 
under the old GAAR, the tax administration could only requalify a legal act (or a series of linked acts), 
if the ultimate legal effects of this new qualification (of act or acts) would be similar to the initial 
qualification used by the taxpayer. As this caused this article to be rather difficult to apply in practice, 
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the GAAR was replaced with the new rule, as already explained in this report. 
Besides this strict interpretation of the (previous) GAAR however, the Supreme Court applied a rather 
extended approach under some other rules, creating new possibilities for the tax administration to 
combat (abusive) tax avoidance.  
E.g. Art. 207, 2 BITC provides that the taxable income of a company
75
 obtained from unusual or 
gratuitous advantages cannot be reduced with certain mentioned tax deductions. In this context the 
Supreme Court defined ‘unusual’ not only as transactions that were not at arms’ length, but also 
applied this rule to income obtained under transactions at arms’ length, but outside of the usual 
economic activities of a certain company.
76
 This jurisprudence was heavily criticized in legal doctrine. 
Although the tax administration recently tried to apply this doctrine in other contexts, the 
jurisprudence does not follow this point of view.
77
 
Also art. 49 BITC has been applied in certain situations as a particular anti-avoidance rule. This article 
determines the general requirements for a cost to be tax deductible. According to this article, costs are 
only deductible when made during a taxable period to gain or maintain taxable income and the 
taxpayer has to proof the reality of the cost, as well as the declared amount. In recent jurisprudence the 
Court deducted from this article that in case of management costs also the reality of delivered services 
had to be justified. A mere written contract between a company and its director would not suffice.
78
    
5. Different bodies with judicial competence  
As mentioned, for delivering a ruling, the Belgian Ruling Commission sometimes demands additional 
aspects/conditions that are not literally figuring in the tax legislation as such. However, this does not 
has to cause a conflict: a ruling is only to provide legal certainty when a certain operation has been 
planned, but not yet executed. Therefore, this does not conflict with jurisprudence on particular cases, 
even if the point of view, as defended by the Ruling Commission, would not be considered obligatory 
in posterior jurisprudence. Nonetheless, in this context it is useful to mention the Ruling procedure, as 
for registration and inheritance taxes the Flemish Region installed its own Ruling Commission.
79
 
Although the legislation on anti-abuse, as well as the clarifying circulars are very similar to the federal 
system, nonetheless this splitting leads to the risk of different interpretations in particular context. 
While the federal anti-avoidance system still applies for the Walloon and Brussels region, the 
interpretation could differ from the qualification given to transactions by the Flemish Ruling 
Commission.  
As far as judicial competence is exercised, Belgium applies a unitary system to deal with cases of tax 
avoidance. In this context it is important to repeat the difference between legal (but combatted) forms 
of tax avoidance and illegal forms of tax fraud. The latter one can be dealt with in tax legislation or in 
criminal prosecutions. For this topic however, reference is made to the report of the 2015 EATLP 
congress.
80
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6. External influences  
As already mentioned, art. 1, §10 Belgian VAT code replaced the (only one year existing) art. 59, §3 
BVAT, to implement a clause more in line with the European jurisprudence as following from the 
Courts judgements in cases as Halifax81, Kofoed82, Part Service83 and Weald leasing84. 
 
As far as the GAAR in the context of income taxes is concerned, as already mentioned, scholars 
discussed about the precise meaning of the text. Some considered it an integration of the Dutch 
‘fraus legis’-doctrine in the Belgian tax system85, while according to some other authors this would 
severely limit the scope of this provision86 and other scholars do focus on perceived differences with 
the Dutch doctrine.87  
Besides the legislator mentioned to be influenced by the European jurisprudence, but the reference 
to the mentioned case law (Part Services and Foggia) is disputed. 88 At least, it can be noticed that  
the government seems to consider it necessary to add an additional particular provision for the 
implementation of the anti-abuse provision of art. 1, §2 -§3 Parent subsidiary directive89, and the 
burden of proof differs from the new proposal in art. 6 of the anti-tax avoidance directive, as will be 
illustrated in the next chapter. 
 
II. The meaning of avoidance and aggressive tax planning and the BEPS 
initiative 
1. European demand for domestic General Anti-avoidance Rules (GAARs)  
As already explained, as far as income taxes, registration duties and inheritance taxes are concerned 
the definition of tax avoidance is included in the text of the GAAR, as this text has been amended in 
2012. The previous text, leaving a possibility for the administration to requalify certain acts under the 
very stringent conditions set in jurisprudence to maintain a qualification with similar effects, was 
rather hard to apply for the administration and therefore ineffective.   
Under the new rule, in line with recommendation 8806 of 6 December 2012, as well as art. 6 of the 
Anti-tax avoidance directive, the administration no longer has to requalify given facts into an 
applicable legal qualification with similar legal consequences, but only has to respect the given facts 
to which other legal consequences can be confined. However, it is clear that the precise 
consequences of the treatment possibilities for the tax administration are not completely cleared 
out. Whereas all three texts recognize the power of the administration to ignore abusive 
arrangements, the formulation of the consequences attached thereto differs. Under the 2012 EC-
recommendation a tax treatment should be applied “by reference to their economic substance”. The 
anti-tax avoidance directive refers to a calculation “in accordance with national law”. The Belgian 
text provides a restoration to submit the arrangement to “a taxation in line with the aim of the 
particular tax provision, as if the abuse did not have taken place”. Nonetheless, all three formulations 
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leave a certain unavoidable scope for the tax administration to fill in. As being described, the Belgian 
administration hereby offers itself a large autonomy, which is disputed in Belgian legal doctrine. 
When the definition of abuse under the three rules is compared, there are some differences. All 
provisions consider the possibility that one act, as well as a series of acts can constitute tax abuse. 
However, as mentioned, the Belgian GAAR requires the administration to proof an objective element 
(a taxation being avoided or a tax favour being obtained, in contrast with the purpose of the 
particular legal provision), and the start of a subjective element (operation is organized to obtain this 
tax effect). Given that both aspects can be demonstrated by all legal means, it might be assumed that 
the objective element will function as a presumption for the subjective element, although both 
aspects form separate parts of the notion of tax abuse. It will be up to the tax payer to demonstrate 
other (economic, financial or private) motives that made him apply this particular legal setting. 
The European provisions seem to make a less clear distinction between an objective and a subjective 
element, as the subjective element helps to describe the objective element.  This causes the initial 
burden of proof being left over more to the tax administration. The objective element (‘an artificial 
arrangement avoiding taxation and leading to a tax benefit’ vs ‘non-genuine arrangement(s) causing 
the acquirement of a tax advantage’) has to be the purpose for the taxpayer. However, where the 
2012 recommendation required the tax avoidance to be the essential purpose of the arrangement(s), 
for the new directive  it suffices if obtaining a tax advantage is one of the main purposes. The mere 
formulation of other (financial, economic or private) purposes besides tax avoidance seems not 
necessarily sufficient to exclude the GAAR. Nonetheless, if “valid commercial reasons which reflect 
economic reality” are present, arrangements are not presumed to be non-genuine.  
In this formulation, as  well as §11 of the preceding statements in the directive, only valid economic 
(including financial) reasons seem to be accepted. Private reasons are not mentioned as such. 
Finally, §11 of the Directive explicitly accepts the possibility for Member States to apply penalties, in 
case a GAAR is applicable. Although criticized by Belgian scholars, as mentioned, the Belgian tax 
administration also considers this to be possible under art. 344 BITC. 
2. Subject-to-tax rules to deal with double non-taxation 
Art. 156 BITC provides a particular unilateral remedy against double taxation of Belgian resident 
persons earning foreign taxable income: the Belgian income taxes linked to this income are cut in 
half. However for some categories (e.g. professional income), this rule only applies if the foreign 
income has been ‘taxed’ under a foreign tax system. In a famous decision of 1970, the Belgian 
Supreme Court however considered an explicit legal exemption to be considered as ‘taxed’ for the 
purposes of this article.90  
This interpretation has raised a particular attention in Belgian tax practice to the precise wording of 
the exemption method in art. 23 of the double tax conventions, in case Belgium is a residence state 
of a taxpayer. The tax administration makes a distinction between income which ‘may be taxed/is 
taxable in the source state’ (meaning that Belgium is always applying the exemption method, without 
verifying the treatment in the source state), income which ‘is taxed in the source state’ (meaning that 
a particular legal exemption has to be foreseen in the source state’s domestic legislation, in which 
case Belgium will exempt) and income which ‘is effectively taxed in the source state’ (meaning the 
income has to be submitted to income taxation, before Belgium applies the exemption method.)91 
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This interpretation however has to be completed with the OECD solution for conflicting 
interpretations leading to a double non-taxation, as expressed in the Partnership-report and 
repeated under action 2 of the BEPS action plan. It also has to be noticed that this administrative 
point of view is not always followed in jurisprudence92 or legal doctrine93 and in some treaties the 
contracting States provide a particular interpretation. 94 The Belgian 2010 Model Convention 
therefore expressly provides that “Belgium shall only exempt such income from tax to the extent that 
such income is effectively taxed in …”. As far as the words ‘taxed’ are used, §6 of an additional 
protocol provides that subjection to the normally applicable tax system is enough. 
As far as Belgium is the source state of income falling under the ‘other income’-article, until 2010 
Belgium made an observation that, as a source state it would be able to tax the income, unless it had 
been taxed in the residence state.95 This observation has been removed in the OECD Commentary of 
2014. The Belgian 2010 Model convention however, expressly adds this subject to tax requirement in 
an additional paragraph to the other income article. 
 
III. The meaning of avoidance and aggressive tax planning and the BEPS 
initiative 
 
1. Transfer pricing rules 
Based on the legality principle, the Belgian tax rules are based on a ‘legal reality’, which cannot be 
changed by interpreting actions with concepts such as an ‘economic reality’. However, as far as 
transfer pricing is at stake, conditions of transactions are verified, whether they are ‘at arm’s length’.  
Some rules could be considered to be in between of SAARs and TP-regulations96, but in general anti-
avoidance rules focus on the transactions themselves, whereas TP-aspects merely correct the 
economic conditions of certain transactions. 
 
Two judgements of the Belgian Supreme Court have already been mentioned that apply art. 207, al. 
2 BITC in a context to combat tax abuse. However, where the tax administration tried to apply this 
same analysis in recent case law, lower court’s judgments do not follow this approach.97 
 
2. Particular clauses in double tax conventions  
Belgium has no particular LOB clause in its model convention. If at present such clause has been 
added in the convention (see e.g. art. 21 of the double tax convention with the US) it is because of an 
initiative of the other contracting state.  
However in its action plan, formulated in December 2015, the Belgian Minister of Finance accepted 
that, in light of the BEPS initiatives, additional clauses could be added in existing treaties and new 
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treaties would contain more anti-avoidance clauses. In particular the ‘principal purpose test’98, as 
well as a ‘Limitation on benefits-clause’ and a particular reaction against conduit-companies were 
considered possible options.99  
 
This has to be distinguished from the use of domestic anti-avoidance rules when a tax treaty is at 
stake. In this context on the one hand an abusive use of a tax treaty cannot be combatted with a 
domestic GAAR, because, as already mentioned, the scope of each GAAR is limited to the tax code 
where it has been implemented. Therefore art. 344, §1 BITC e.g. could only be applied when internal 
rules of the BITC, that further implement the functioning of a tax treaty, are circumvented. However, 
as Belgium has a monistic system, treaties are immediately applicable in the domestic law order, 
without further implementation. The effect of a domestic anti-avoidance rule will therefore be very 
limited.100 On the other hand the question rises whether through domestic rules, the functioning of a 
treaty can be changed (because of a different qualification, tax rate, …). In this context Belgium 
adheres to the OECD Commentary as changed in 2003. In short, this leads to the conclusion that, if 
the taxing power is accorded to Belgium, it can also apply its GAAR, causing a higher tax burden. 
However, the division of tax powers cannot be changed with a domestic GAAR. 
 
3. CFC-legislation 
Until a few years ago, Belgium hardly had any kind of particular CFC-reglementation. Art. 344, §2 
BITC limited the effect of a transfer of rights, licenses or other forms of intellectual property, as well 
as amounts of money in case of a transfer to a foreign taxpayer residing in a tax haven. This was not 
binding for the tax administration, unless a taxpayer proved he obtained the market value in 
exchange or the transaction corresponded with justifiable financial or economic reasons. 
An important additional rule was installed by Law of 23 December 2009.101 As from 1 January 2010 
corporate taxpayers have to declare to the tax administration all direct or indirect payments to a 
person residing in a qualified country. 2 possible categories are mentioned. On the one hand, this 
rule targets payments to countries that, after a phase 2 review of the OECD Global Forum 
Committee, are considered to be non-compliant with  the exchange of information on request 
standard for the entire tax year.102 On the other hand a Belgian list is provided in art. 179 Royal 
Decree executing the BITC.103 Payments have to be declared, once the total of payments exceeds 
100.000 EUR.  If a payment is not declared, it is generally not tax deductible.104 If a payment is 
declared, a taxpayer needs to proof that it is a genuine, economically valid transaction and not being 
set up with an artificial legal structure. This rule has been interpreted in a very broad way by the tax 
administration, as far as the notions of ‘payment’ or ‘residency’ in a qualified country are 
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concerned.105 As such a payment does not necessarily has to be a deductible cost, but can be any 
transfer of economic value, on its own behalf, as well as for third parties106. The link with a qualified 
country is fulfilled, if this is the residence of a person, or if the payment is to a bank account situated 
in these countries (unless the taxpayer proves a residency elsewhere). 
Finally, as from tax year 2014, natural persons had to declare the existence of a so-called ‘juridical 
construction’ if they participated in this construction or benefitted from certain advantages. Whereas 
this legislation started with a mere declaration107, as from tax year 2016 this has been further 
elaborated into the so-called ‘Cayman-tax’108: a ‘juridical construction’109 is considered to be tax 
transparent and its income is taxed at the level of Belgian settlors or beneficiaries110. This 
transparency not only applies to natural persons111, but also to non-commercial legal entities112. 
Such juridical construction can be an entity without legal personality113, or a legal entity not being 
submitted to an income tax regime or being taxed at a tax rate of less than 15 %, calculated 
according to Belgian tax legislation. For this second category two royal decrees further determine the 
scope. As far as entities are located within the European Union, a Royal Decree of 18 December 
2015114 provides an exhaustive list. For entities outside the EU an illustrative, more extensive list is 
provided in a Royal Decree of 23 August 2015.115 Besides technical provisions for the functioning of 
this transparency, the legislator also added an additional GAAR116 stating that the acts of such an 
entity are not opposable to the tax administration, when taxing the taxpayers behind the entity 
under the transparency regime. This final CFC regulation has raised a lot of criticism from legal 
doctrine, as the precise functioning, boundaries and application still leave a lot of questions 
unanswered. 117 It might be expected that this will be further adapted and inspired by the new 
proposal of art. 7-8 of the the anti-tax avoidance directive. 
4. Linking rules 
As already explained in its double tax conventions Belgium, as a residence state, applies the 
exemption method. In this context it often demands income to be taxed in the source state or at 
least being integrated in tax legislation.  Also the advantageous tax legislation of another country will 
often be a criterion for particular anti-avoidance rules to apply, such as e.g. a deduction refusal, the 
transparency regime of the Cayman tax, or a thin cap-regulation. 
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Also, to avoid an economic double taxation of distributed dividends, the Belgian exemption method 
requires that the dividend distributing company has been submitted to taxation.118   
 
However, Belgium does not yet apply technical linking rules, such as been described in the BEPS 
action 2. Even more, although art. 4,1 of the parent-subsidiary directive provides that this had to be 
foreseen before 1 January 2016, the Belgium exemption system still hasn’t been brought in line with 
these prerequisites. A proposal thereto has been discussed at ministerial level and is expected to be 
implemented soon. 
 
5. Limits on the deduction of interest 
 
Besides the general prerequisites for a cost to be deductible figuring in art. 49 BITC, several rules 
further limit the deduction of interest costs in the income tax legislation. 
 
First of all interest is only deductible in as far as it does not exceed regular market conditions.119 This 
limit does not apply to payments of financial institutions, as well as payments to these institutions 
(unless in the latter case, this entity is a directly or indirectly related company with the debtor of the 
intrest).120 Besides interest payments to a foreign taxpayer or a foreign PE are not deductible, in case 
these persons are not submitted to income taxation or the payments benefit from a seriously more 
advantageous tax treatment compared to the Belgian tax treatment of such income.
121
 This rule has 
already been mentioned under I.4, as the Court of Justice considered this rule to violate the European 
freedoms because of its vague terms.
 122 
 
Finally, two more particular thin cap rules further limit the deduction of interest costs. 
A first rule focuses in particular on debts accorded by shareholders or directors123. If they borrow to 
their company an amount exceeding the equity of the company124 or at an interest rate above 
market conditions, the paid interest is requalified as a dividend. This requalification applies as well 
for the receiver of the payment (taxed as a dividend), as for the paying company (non-deductible 
dividend). 
Besides an additional limit of 5 times the equity applies for loans from related parties125 or entities 
resident in a tax haven.126 For each category interest paid on the exceeding amount is not deductible. 
This limit was tightened by Law of 29 March 2012.127 It reduced the previous limit of 7:1 and 
extended the category of receivers to related companies. In a subsequent Law of 22 June 2012128 a 
correction has been foreseen for so-called cash pooling-companies within a group of companies.129 
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In particular the second thin cap-rule largely differs from the interest limitation rule of art. 4 of the 
proposal for an anti-tax avoidance directive. This latter rule calculates the deductible interest costs 
on the taxable income instead of the equity and exempted income would be excluded. Moreover, 
this rule seems to apply a larger definition of interest costs and is also applicable for costs paid to 
third parties130. However, as it focuses on ‘exceeding borrowing costs’ netting calculations will still 
remain possible.  
Despite these differences, according to the Belgian Minister of Finance, Belgium could apply for the 
delay until 1 January 2024 (or an agreement between the OECD members), as its domestic legislation 
is ‘equally effective’ to this rule.131  
 
6. Other particular SAARs 
 
As already mentioned in the first chapter of this report, the definition of tax avoidance appears 
through particular legal provisions because of the constitutional legality principle. In SAARs all 
particular kinds of ‘abusive acts’ are mentioned in a combative reaction. Given the very casuistic 
approach, it is sometimes questionable how to interpret these clauses, whereas it lacks general 
coherence. 
 
E.g. because of the link between a director and his company, the possible transactions between 
those related parties are often submitted to additional limits. E.g. this report already mentioned an 
additional thin cap-rule132, but a director is also excluded from a particular tax reduction for 
shareholders investing equity in a startup-company133. However, whereas the thin cap- rule explicitly 
refers to a director, as well as his direct family relatives (spouse and children), this extension only 
partly appears in the tax reduction. As such this investment is not possible in a company that owns 
the immovable property being used by its director, spouse or children134, but as far as the investment 
in the company is considered, only the director himself is excluded.135  
This exclusion for additional tax benefits when investing equity in a company is not foreseen in art. 
269, §2 BITC that provides for a lower withholding tax on dividends to attract shareholders for new 
investments in a company. However, for this tax favor to apply, the new investment cannot come 
from a capital reduction of another company being linked to the person that invests or being linked 
to his relatives (described not only as spouses and children, but also referring to the parents of the 
investing person).136 
In a recent tax support for debt investments, directors are not excluded at all.137  
 
Another example concerns tax advantages for an employer engaging new workers. Under certain 
conditions 25% of the withholding tax on salaries does not have to be transferred to the tax treasury. 
This rule distinguishes in two categories138, whether the company qualifies as an SME based on 
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European criteria.139 Only for the big companies an anti-abuse rule is provided, determining that this 
favor will not apply if the same activity has been exercised by this company in another EU Member 
State and has been stopped within two years before the new engagement or if the employer does 
not confirm that he will stop a similar activity within two years140. It is not clear why this anti-abuse 
clause (especially as far as previous cancelling is concerned) only applies to big companies. 
 
Besides differing, SAARs sometimes even contradict each other. This was the case with different 
provisions that provided for a reduced withholding tax on dividends, if shares were being kept for at 
least a certain delay. Both rules mentioned that in case the liberated capital of the company was 
reduced this reduction primarily had to be imputed on the particularly favored capital.141 As no 
further legal indications existed how both rules could be combined, the administration accepted that 
a taxpayer could freely opt between both rules.142 
 
As already mentioned, in new legislation, the legislator very often adds some particular SAARs. 
However given their very technical and punctual character and lack of general coherence, this causes 
legal uncertainty about their application in practice. Taxpayers are the first that have to deal with 
these rules, whereas the tax administration verifies the application during subsequent tax years. 
Although the struggle against tax avoidance can be considered legitimate, this imbalance leads to a 
similar level of uncertainty as being created with a GAAR. Whereas for a GAAR this cannot be 
avoided, for SAARs the legislator should try to limit this uncertainty for as much and as quick as 
possible. 
IV. Combination of GAARs and SAARs 
As mentioned the formulation of a GAAR is necessarily vague, because of its particular scope to deal 
with transactions within a legal context, but outside the aim of the tax legislation. This is opposed to 
the often much more precisely defined SAARs reacting towards a particular technique.  
In its first general Circular about art. 344 BITC143, the administration therefore confirmed that a GAAR 
would be applicable by way of last resort, in case neither the mere interpretation of a tax rule, its 
technical application provisions, the provided SAARs or the legal doctrine of tax fraud (simulation), 
could help to obtain the aimed taxation. However, this formulation can be questioned as it combines 
several different topics that have nothing to do with a GAAR.  
As explained, a GAAR is meant to react against situations, whereby the strict text of the law is literally 
objectively followed, but with the intention to obtain a result, that was not expected by the 
legislator. This differs from simulation, whereby a disguised operation is being fraudulently 
presented as something different. If a SAAR literally reacts against a certain technique, the text of the 
law as such is changed to avoid it being abused. There is no real hierarchy between those three 
different concepts. 
Finally, the question rises whether a GAAR can be used in case a SAAR has been technically avoided. 
This seems to depend on the character of the SAAR, as well as the abuse. E.g. if a SAAR allows to 
borrow 5 times the amount of equity, this barrier will be accepted and cannot be further limited 
based on a GAAR. However, where family members of a director are not literally mentioned in a 
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SAAR limiting the possibilities of a director of a company towards his company, it might be expected 
that a director circumventing the SAAR through the use of a family member risks to be confronted 
with the GAAR to apply the effects of a particular SAAR, outside its literal scope. It remains however 
clear that, given the vague formulation of a GAAR, necessarily the link with a SAAR will also to a 
certain extent remain vague. 
 
